Who is behind the Ankara attack?

Last Updated on Feb 28, 2016

The implications of the attack are far more important than its perpetrator(s).

On the evening of February 17th, 2016, a car bomb exploded during the rush hour at the political and bureaucratic center of Ankara, behind the headquarters of Turkish Air Forces. The attack killed 28 people, most of whom were soldiers and bureaucrats on their way home at the end of the work day. Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu disclosed the perpetrator as a 24-year-old Syrian YPG member. Two days layer, a PKK-related organization TAK claimed the attack though the name they gave as the attacker did not match the name Davutoglu publicized. On February 23, DNA test conducted by the forensics confirmed the identity of the attacker as the one TAK declared. Thus, culprit behind the attack remained uncertain for a week. We may never know all of the groups or entities involved this bloody attack but the implications of this attack and the ensuing uncertainty are far more telling than the identity of the attacker.

But first, it is important to look back on how this uncertainty came about.

  • One day after the attack, Turkish Prime Minister pointed to YPG as the perpetrator[1].
  • Cemil Bayik, leader of the PKK umbrella organization KCK (Group of Communities of Kurdistan), implicitly endorsed the attack, although he said that he did not know who was behind it[2].
  • PYD/YPG leader Salih Muslim denied responsibility for the attack[3].
  • Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the ambassadors of the P5, Germany, Netherlands and the EU to provide them the evidence that linked the attack to YPG, in an attempt to convince the international public that YPG is indeed a terrorist organization[4].
  • USA stated that they were not convinced by the evidence[5] and that their position on YPG, which Spokesperson of the US Department of State defined as brave Kurds fighting ISIS, has not changed[6]. PYD/YPG are not terrorist organizations for the US.
  • Editor-in-chief of Hurriyet Daily News, Murat Yetkin, penned a column in Turkish internet-daily Radikal, indicating that Turkish official security sources consider the Russian-backed Assad regime to be behind the attack. According to Yetkin’s sources, Turkish Air Forces was the prime target and the attack was a retaliation for the downing of the Russian jet on November 24, 2015[7].
  • Amid the spat between Turkish and US officials on YPG, a Kurdish terrorist organization formed by the militants who left PKK, TAK, claimed responsibility for the attack. However, they provided a different name for the attacker than the one Prime Minister Davutoglu disclosed[8].
  • DNA test by forensics determined the identity of the attacker as the one TAK declared[9].

Each of the aforementioned actors may be lying or telling the truth. The real perpetrator(s), if they were different than the one Prime Minister Davutoglu stated or different than the organization that claimed the attack, may never be revealed to the public. However, the attack and the ensuing uncertainty about its culprit imply that:

  1. Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war is claiming lives of the civilians on a regular basis.

This is the 4th Syria-related  major suicide attack targeting Turkish citizens within last 8 months[10]. Death toll of these 4 major attacks is 173, which is unacceptable for most of the Turkish citizens.

  1. The list of entities that could retaliate against Turkey is growing.

While Turkey opted for active involvement in the Syrian civil war to increase its influence in the region, within 5 years it appears Turkey has made more enemies than friends; at the same time damaging relations with its long-time allies. Turkey has now become susceptible to any kind of attacks from Russia, Assad regime, PKK-YPG, TAK, ISIS, Hezbollah[11] and other extremist groups operating in Syria. These attacks are not limited to military sector. Turkey is now facing an economic war with Russia, as well as having to deal with high-level political attacks at the UN Security Council[12].

To make things worse, Turkey now cannot easily count on its traditional allies, the USA and NATO members, as there are deep disagreements, which often lead to spats between statespeople, about who to support and how to act in Syria. To compensate for these troublesome alliances, Turkey is seeking to form new military alliances in the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE, which does not seem very stable on its own even in the eyes of Turkish policy-makers[13].

  1. Most of the Turkish public is feeling unsafe.

Terrorist attacks carry two kinds of messages; a general and a specific one. The general message aims to demonstrate to the public that their state is unable to protect its citizens, thereby creating an aura of panic, insecurity and mistrust between the state and the citizens. The specific message pertains to the relations between the state and the perpetrator. It may be a retaliation for a previous crack-down, a statement or expression of a particular demand.

After the attack, both the TV pundits and social media users began raising their suspicions about a security weakness in the Turkish security institutions, putting forward that the area of the attack, which hosts the Parliament, Military HQs, and the Ministry of Interior, should be the most secure place in the country.

The security institutions face a predicament here. They are often judged by their failures not by their successes. Although Turkish security forces prevent numbers of attacks on a daily basis, the ones that slip through their radar for various reasons raise issues about their resoluteness.

More importantly, the current aura of insecurity is likely to imply a public discontent about Turkish foreign policy in Syria.

 

[1] Turkey blames Kurdish militants for Ankara car bombing  http://apne.ws/1TsA9hj

[2] Cemil Bayık: Ankara’daki eylem misilleme olabilir http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/cemil-bayik-ankaradaki-eylem-misilleme-olabilir

[3] Syrian Kurdish PYD head denies responsibility for Ankara attack  http://reut.rs/1mJn8lu

[4] Turkey blames Kurdish militants for Ankara car bombing  http://apne.ws/1TsA9hj

[5] Rhodes: Biz failleri tespit edemedik http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/rhodes-biz-failleri-tespit-edemedik

[6] ABD’den Ankara saldırısı sonrası YPG açıklaması: Pozisyonumuz aynı – http://www.radikal.com.tr/dunya/abdden-ankara-saldirisi-sonrasi-ypg-aciklamasi-pozisyonumuz-ayni-1513642//

[7] Hedef Hava Kuvvetleri’miydi? – http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat_yetkin/hedef-hava-kuvvetlerimiydi-1513142

[8] Ankara saldırısını TAK üstlendi – http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ankara-saldirisini-tak-ustlendi-1514200//

[9]BBC Türkçe – ‘Ankara saldırısını gerçekleştirenin kimliği kesinleşti’ http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160223_ankara_saldiri_kimlik

[10] For a complete list of terrorist attacks against civilians in Turkey in the last 12 months see: A list of deadly attacks in Turkey over the past year http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/a-timeline-of-bomb-attacks-in-turkey-between-2015-2016-a6879841.html

[11] The Latest: Hezbollah leader slams Turkey, Saudi Arabia  http://apne.ws/1QpUL3l

[12] BMGK: “Türkiye’nin PYD’yi bombalamasından endişe duyuyoruz” http://www.cnnturk.com/dunya/bmgk-turkiyenin-pydyi-bombalamasindan-endise-duyuyoruz

[13] Çavuşoğlu: Kara operasyonunda mutabakat http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/cavusoglu-kara-operasyonunda-mutabakat

4 things you need to know about Turkish shelling of YPG

Turkish artillery shelled YPG positions in Azaz and Mannagh, Syria on February 13 and 14[1]. For most of the analysts, this move added another layer to the intricate civil war in Syria. Below are 4 things you need to know about Turkish shelling of YPG positions:

  1. The shelling was planned ahead with all warning signs:

Aiming to prevent the creation of a continuous Kurdish belt controlled by PYD, the Syria affiliate of PKK,  on its southern border, Turkey has been threatening to hit PYD,  and its armed branch YPG, for some time. With Afrin on the western end and Haseke on the eastern end, right now, the belt is interrupted by first a region close to Aleppo, where the regime forces are clashing with the opposition groups to retake the city and cut their supply line.  Second, an ISIS controlled region east of this battleground further divides the Kurdish belt. Turkey was expecting a PYD attempt to unify this belt from the eastern part and Turkish threats for military intervention depended on the condition that the organization crossed to the “west of the Euphrates”. However, amid the turmoil of the clashes between the Russian-backed regime forces and  the opposition in Aleppo, PYD opted for making advances from Afrin, the western end and captured the Mannagh airbase on February 10[2].

It appears that Turkish policy-makers conceived the possibility of hitting PYD after the capture of this base. On the following day, Prime Minister Davutoglu repeated the threat to hit YPG but this time without referring to the “west of Euphrates” condition. He said that Turkey would take the same precautions it has been taking against PKK (read: military action) if PYD causes any threat to Turkey[3].

Second, a prominent ideologue of AK Party and Spokesperson for the Presidency, Ibrahim Kalin published an opinion piece on the day of the shelling in Daily Sabah, a pro-government newspaper, in which he expressed disbelief in the Munich agreement for cessation of hostilities in Syria and emphasized on the need to establish “balance of power” on the ground[4]. As he takes the YPG capture of the Mannagh airbase as a “case in point”, it is possible analyse that the shelling was a politically planned move by Turkey.

  1. The shelling tested American position on YPG:

While US has repeatedly made it certain that it does not consider PYD and YPG terrorist organizations, it is compelled to strike an unsteady balance between Turkish demands and PYD/YPG. US warned both parties after the shelling, calling for Turkey to stop hitting YPG targets and criticizing YPG for making territorial gains amid the turmoil of the Russia-backed regime siege on Aleppo[5]. This double warning signifies that Turkey and YPG are equally significant allies in the eyes of the US policy makers, which -according to  Turkish Foreign Ministry- implies that the US assumes similar status to a sovereign state and an armed militia [6].

  1. “Fight against ISIS” has become a cover story for everything but “the fight against ISIS”

Most of the actors use the phrase “fight against ISIS” as a cover story to further their interests, which often have little to do with taking down the terrorist organization.

PYD consider the fight against ISIS as a path to gain international legitimacy and possibly self-government in the near future[7].

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE use it to bolster their support to “moderate opposition” and overthrow the Assad regime. Just as regime forces mobilize to retake Aleppo from the rebels, Saudi Arabia, a staunch sponsor of the anti-Assad rebels, sent war jets to the Incirlik airbase in Turkey “to be used on the fight against ISIS[8]“. Yet, considering that the base is at 180 km distance from Aleppo battleground and Latakia, where Russian military base is placed, it is more likely that the jets aim to show muscle against the Russian-backed regime forces rather than ISIS. In the same vein, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey increased their calls to execute a multilateral ground operation in Syria to “counter ISIS[9]|[10]”. Yet the timing of these calls overlap with regime advances on the opposition.

Finally, Russia and the Assad regime are using the phrase -a broadened version of it as “fight against terrorism”- to give international legitimacy to their joint operations against the moderate opposition.

  1. Reshuffling of borders in Syria and Iraq is now an acknowledged possibility

While the artificiality of the borders in the Middle East has been a widely discussed in the academic literature and politics, the possibility of a change in these borders in Syria and Iraq is now being acknowledged on state-level. This year is of symbolic significance in this regard as it is the centennial of the Sykes-Picot agreement between England and France, which is credited for most of the current borders in the Middle East.

Within this context, Kurds in Syria and Iraq are undertaking initiatives to declare self-rule[11]. PYD declared the autonomous Western Kurdistan (Rojava) region within Syrian borders in 2013. Mesud Barzani, the head of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq has been expressing his will to “end the Sykes-Picot era” and declare independence[12]. Although opposing the idea of an independent Kurdistan on its southern and south-eastern border, AK Party spokesperson Omer Celik also acknowledged the artificiality of borders in the region[13]. Similarly, Prime Minister Davutoglu recently stressed on the problematic borders of the Sykes-Picot[14]. The positions of the actors differ but they unite in the discourse that the Sykes-Picot agreement created unstable borders, which are open to discussion.

The attempts to change the borders in the Middle East does not come from the Kurds only. According to President Erdogan, Assad is aiming to found -in Erdogan’s words- “a boutique Syria” encompassing 15% of the Syrian borders[15]. Thus, it appears that most of the prominent actors of the conflict in Syria and Iraq acknowledge the possibility that borders can change in the near future. Some analysts go even further and speculate that recent Turkish military assertiveness in Syria signifies an initiative to influence this expected change of borders in Syria and Iraq[16].

 

[1] Turkey strikes Kurdish militia in Syria, demands it withdraw http://reut.rs/1TYYvP4

[2] YPG Suriye’de ‘Menag hava üssünü ele geçirdi’ http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160211_ypg_menag_hava_ussu

[3] Davutoğlu’ndan “PYD’yi vururuz” mesajı http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/davutoglundan-pydyi-vururuz-mesaji

[4] War, diplomacy and the Syrian tragedy http://sabahdai.ly/Ga6dy8

[5] Beyaz Saray’dan Biden-Davutoğlu açıklaması http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/beyaz-saraydan-biden-davutoglu-aciklamasi

[6] Dışişleri’nden Kirby’ye: Şiddetle protesto ediyoruz http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/disislerinden-kirbyye-siddetle-protesto-ediyoruz

[7] Müslim: Artık terörist olarak görmüyorlar http://bit.ly/1CMEG4O

[8] ‘Suudi jetleri Türkiye’de’ http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/suudi-jetleri-turkiyede

[9] ‘Suriye’ye kara gücü aciliyet kazandı’ http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/suriyeye-kara-gucu-aciliyet-kazandi

[10] Çavuşoğlu: S. Arabistan ile kara operasyona girebiliriz http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160213_suudi_jet

[11] It is important to note that main Kurdish political organizations is Syria (PYD) and Iraq (KDP) are in ideological conflict and do not  exhibit a unified stance towards the independence of Kurds in Syria and Iraq.

[12] Iraqi Kurdistan president: time has come to redraw Middle East boundaries http://gu.com/p/4g372/stw

[13] Independence of Iraqi Kurdistan would further complicate Sykes-Picot instability: Turkey’s AKP http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=94775&NewsCatID=338

[14] Davutoğlu, 10 maddelik eylem planını açıkladı http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1191137-basbakan-davutoglu-10-baslikta-master-plani-acikladi

[15] Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan ‘Esad’ açıklaması http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-esad-aciklamasi-30154366?utm_source=t.co&utm_campaign=button&utm_content=newsdetail

[16] Predicting Turkey’s next move in Syria http://aje.io/px5c