Category: Genel

Perception Management: Postmodernism in Daily Politics

On February 22, 2016, Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs issued a statement on the comments of European Parliament Turkey Rapporteur Kati Piri. The rapporteur was harshly criticized and threatened with denial of official correspondence if she did not acknowledge PKK as a terrorist organization. Though I am not particularly interested in this aspect of Turkey-EU relations, one phrase that is used in the statement is of theoretical importance for IR; “perception management”.

The significance of the term pertains to the postmodernist approach in IR, which argue that representations of an event yield more political power than the event itself. Therefore, whenever the phrase “perception management” is used (you will see it a lot if you are interested in Turkish politics), it is safe to assume that regardless of the actual event, there is a political power play going on in which one party is striving to win over the opinion of a group of strategic importance.

The phrase “perception management” is a magical one in this sense. Blaming someone for resorting to the techniques of perception management becomes in itself a part of the perception management operation. It indicates a truth claim, an expertise on how and why something happened, more than often highlighting a particular (i.e.: favorable) aspect and discrediting the less acceptable parts. The mere utterance of the phrase makes some aspects real and other aspects un-real.

Who is behind the Ankara attack?

Last Updated on Feb 28, 2016

The implications of the attack are far more important than its perpetrator(s).

On the evening of February 17th, 2016, a car bomb exploded during the rush hour at the political and bureaucratic center of Ankara, behind the headquarters of Turkish Air Forces. The attack killed 28 people, most of whom were soldiers and bureaucrats on their way home at the end of the work day. Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu disclosed the perpetrator as a 24-year-old Syrian YPG member. Two days layer, a PKK-related organization TAK claimed the attack though the name they gave as the attacker did not match the name Davutoglu publicized. On February 23, DNA test conducted by the forensics confirmed the identity of the attacker as the one TAK declared. Thus, culprit behind the attack remained uncertain for a week. We may never know all of the groups or entities involved this bloody attack but the implications of this attack and the ensuing uncertainty are far more telling than the identity of the attacker.

But first, it is important to look back on how this uncertainty came about.

  • One day after the attack, Turkish Prime Minister pointed to YPG as the perpetrator[1].
  • Cemil Bayik, leader of the PKK umbrella organization KCK (Group of Communities of Kurdistan), implicitly endorsed the attack, although he said that he did not know who was behind it[2].
  • PYD/YPG leader Salih Muslim denied responsibility for the attack[3].
  • Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the ambassadors of the P5, Germany, Netherlands and the EU to provide them the evidence that linked the attack to YPG, in an attempt to convince the international public that YPG is indeed a terrorist organization[4].
  • USA stated that they were not convinced by the evidence[5] and that their position on YPG, which Spokesperson of the US Department of State defined as brave Kurds fighting ISIS, has not changed[6]. PYD/YPG are not terrorist organizations for the US.
  • Editor-in-chief of Hurriyet Daily News, Murat Yetkin, penned a column in Turkish internet-daily Radikal, indicating that Turkish official security sources consider the Russian-backed Assad regime to be behind the attack. According to Yetkin’s sources, Turkish Air Forces was the prime target and the attack was a retaliation for the downing of the Russian jet on November 24, 2015[7].
  • Amid the spat between Turkish and US officials on YPG, a Kurdish terrorist organization formed by the militants who left PKK, TAK, claimed responsibility for the attack. However, they provided a different name for the attacker than the one Prime Minister Davutoglu disclosed[8].
  • DNA test by forensics determined the identity of the attacker as the one TAK declared[9].

Each of the aforementioned actors may be lying or telling the truth. The real perpetrator(s), if they were different than the one Prime Minister Davutoglu stated or different than the organization that claimed the attack, may never be revealed to the public. However, the attack and the ensuing uncertainty about its culprit imply that:

  1. Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war is claiming lives of the civilians on a regular basis.

This is the 4th Syria-related  major suicide attack targeting Turkish citizens within last 8 months[10]. Death toll of these 4 major attacks is 173, which is unacceptable for most of the Turkish citizens.

  1. The list of entities that could retaliate against Turkey is growing.

While Turkey opted for active involvement in the Syrian civil war to increase its influence in the region, within 5 years it appears Turkey has made more enemies than friends; at the same time damaging relations with its long-time allies. Turkey has now become susceptible to any kind of attacks from Russia, Assad regime, PKK-YPG, TAK, ISIS, Hezbollah[11] and other extremist groups operating in Syria. These attacks are not limited to military sector. Turkey is now facing an economic war with Russia, as well as having to deal with high-level political attacks at the UN Security Council[12].

To make things worse, Turkey now cannot easily count on its traditional allies, the USA and NATO members, as there are deep disagreements, which often lead to spats between statespeople, about who to support and how to act in Syria. To compensate for these troublesome alliances, Turkey is seeking to form new military alliances in the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE, which does not seem very stable on its own even in the eyes of Turkish policy-makers[13].

  1. Most of the Turkish public is feeling unsafe.

Terrorist attacks carry two kinds of messages; a general and a specific one. The general message aims to demonstrate to the public that their state is unable to protect its citizens, thereby creating an aura of panic, insecurity and mistrust between the state and the citizens. The specific message pertains to the relations between the state and the perpetrator. It may be a retaliation for a previous crack-down, a statement or expression of a particular demand.

After the attack, both the TV pundits and social media users began raising their suspicions about a security weakness in the Turkish security institutions, putting forward that the area of the attack, which hosts the Parliament, Military HQs, and the Ministry of Interior, should be the most secure place in the country.

The security institutions face a predicament here. They are often judged by their failures not by their successes. Although Turkish security forces prevent numbers of attacks on a daily basis, the ones that slip through their radar for various reasons raise issues about their resoluteness.

More importantly, the current aura of insecurity is likely to imply a public discontent about Turkish foreign policy in Syria.

 

[1] Turkey blames Kurdish militants for Ankara car bombing  http://apne.ws/1TsA9hj

[2] Cemil Bayık: Ankara’daki eylem misilleme olabilir http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/cemil-bayik-ankaradaki-eylem-misilleme-olabilir

[3] Syrian Kurdish PYD head denies responsibility for Ankara attack  http://reut.rs/1mJn8lu

[4] Turkey blames Kurdish militants for Ankara car bombing  http://apne.ws/1TsA9hj

[5] Rhodes: Biz failleri tespit edemedik http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/rhodes-biz-failleri-tespit-edemedik

[6] ABD’den Ankara saldırısı sonrası YPG açıklaması: Pozisyonumuz aynı – http://www.radikal.com.tr/dunya/abdden-ankara-saldirisi-sonrasi-ypg-aciklamasi-pozisyonumuz-ayni-1513642//

[7] Hedef Hava Kuvvetleri’miydi? – http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat_yetkin/hedef-hava-kuvvetlerimiydi-1513142

[8] Ankara saldırısını TAK üstlendi – http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ankara-saldirisini-tak-ustlendi-1514200//

[9]BBC Türkçe – ‘Ankara saldırısını gerçekleştirenin kimliği kesinleşti’ http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160223_ankara_saldiri_kimlik

[10] For a complete list of terrorist attacks against civilians in Turkey in the last 12 months see: A list of deadly attacks in Turkey over the past year http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/a-timeline-of-bomb-attacks-in-turkey-between-2015-2016-a6879841.html

[11] The Latest: Hezbollah leader slams Turkey, Saudi Arabia  http://apne.ws/1QpUL3l

[12] BMGK: “Türkiye’nin PYD’yi bombalamasından endişe duyuyoruz” http://www.cnnturk.com/dunya/bmgk-turkiyenin-pydyi-bombalamasindan-endise-duyuyoruz

[13] Çavuşoğlu: Kara operasyonunda mutabakat http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/cavusoglu-kara-operasyonunda-mutabakat

4 things you need to know about Turkish shelling of YPG

Turkish artillery shelled YPG positions in Azaz and Mannagh, Syria on February 13 and 14[1]. For most of the analysts, this move added another layer to the intricate civil war in Syria. Below are 4 things you need to know about Turkish shelling of YPG positions:

  1. The shelling was planned ahead with all warning signs:

Aiming to prevent the creation of a continuous Kurdish belt controlled by PYD, the Syria affiliate of PKK,  on its southern border, Turkey has been threatening to hit PYD,  and its armed branch YPG, for some time. With Afrin on the western end and Haseke on the eastern end, right now, the belt is interrupted by first a region close to Aleppo, where the regime forces are clashing with the opposition groups to retake the city and cut their supply line.  Second, an ISIS controlled region east of this battleground further divides the Kurdish belt. Turkey was expecting a PYD attempt to unify this belt from the eastern part and Turkish threats for military intervention depended on the condition that the organization crossed to the “west of the Euphrates”. However, amid the turmoil of the clashes between the Russian-backed regime forces and  the opposition in Aleppo, PYD opted for making advances from Afrin, the western end and captured the Mannagh airbase on February 10[2].

It appears that Turkish policy-makers conceived the possibility of hitting PYD after the capture of this base. On the following day, Prime Minister Davutoglu repeated the threat to hit YPG but this time without referring to the “west of Euphrates” condition. He said that Turkey would take the same precautions it has been taking against PKK (read: military action) if PYD causes any threat to Turkey[3].

Second, a prominent ideologue of AK Party and Spokesperson for the Presidency, Ibrahim Kalin published an opinion piece on the day of the shelling in Daily Sabah, a pro-government newspaper, in which he expressed disbelief in the Munich agreement for cessation of hostilities in Syria and emphasized on the need to establish “balance of power” on the ground[4]. As he takes the YPG capture of the Mannagh airbase as a “case in point”, it is possible analyse that the shelling was a politically planned move by Turkey.

  1. The shelling tested American position on YPG:

While US has repeatedly made it certain that it does not consider PYD and YPG terrorist organizations, it is compelled to strike an unsteady balance between Turkish demands and PYD/YPG. US warned both parties after the shelling, calling for Turkey to stop hitting YPG targets and criticizing YPG for making territorial gains amid the turmoil of the Russia-backed regime siege on Aleppo[5]. This double warning signifies that Turkey and YPG are equally significant allies in the eyes of the US policy makers, which -according to  Turkish Foreign Ministry- implies that the US assumes similar status to a sovereign state and an armed militia [6].

  1. “Fight against ISIS” has become a cover story for everything but “the fight against ISIS”

Most of the actors use the phrase “fight against ISIS” as a cover story to further their interests, which often have little to do with taking down the terrorist organization.

PYD consider the fight against ISIS as a path to gain international legitimacy and possibly self-government in the near future[7].

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE use it to bolster their support to “moderate opposition” and overthrow the Assad regime. Just as regime forces mobilize to retake Aleppo from the rebels, Saudi Arabia, a staunch sponsor of the anti-Assad rebels, sent war jets to the Incirlik airbase in Turkey “to be used on the fight against ISIS[8]“. Yet, considering that the base is at 180 km distance from Aleppo battleground and Latakia, where Russian military base is placed, it is more likely that the jets aim to show muscle against the Russian-backed regime forces rather than ISIS. In the same vein, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey increased their calls to execute a multilateral ground operation in Syria to “counter ISIS[9]|[10]”. Yet the timing of these calls overlap with regime advances on the opposition.

Finally, Russia and the Assad regime are using the phrase -a broadened version of it as “fight against terrorism”- to give international legitimacy to their joint operations against the moderate opposition.

  1. Reshuffling of borders in Syria and Iraq is now an acknowledged possibility

While the artificiality of the borders in the Middle East has been a widely discussed in the academic literature and politics, the possibility of a change in these borders in Syria and Iraq is now being acknowledged on state-level. This year is of symbolic significance in this regard as it is the centennial of the Sykes-Picot agreement between England and France, which is credited for most of the current borders in the Middle East.

Within this context, Kurds in Syria and Iraq are undertaking initiatives to declare self-rule[11]. PYD declared the autonomous Western Kurdistan (Rojava) region within Syrian borders in 2013. Mesud Barzani, the head of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq has been expressing his will to “end the Sykes-Picot era” and declare independence[12]. Although opposing the idea of an independent Kurdistan on its southern and south-eastern border, AK Party spokesperson Omer Celik also acknowledged the artificiality of borders in the region[13]. Similarly, Prime Minister Davutoglu recently stressed on the problematic borders of the Sykes-Picot[14]. The positions of the actors differ but they unite in the discourse that the Sykes-Picot agreement created unstable borders, which are open to discussion.

The attempts to change the borders in the Middle East does not come from the Kurds only. According to President Erdogan, Assad is aiming to found -in Erdogan’s words- “a boutique Syria” encompassing 15% of the Syrian borders[15]. Thus, it appears that most of the prominent actors of the conflict in Syria and Iraq acknowledge the possibility that borders can change in the near future. Some analysts go even further and speculate that recent Turkish military assertiveness in Syria signifies an initiative to influence this expected change of borders in Syria and Iraq[16].

 

[1] Turkey strikes Kurdish militia in Syria, demands it withdraw http://reut.rs/1TYYvP4

[2] YPG Suriye’de ‘Menag hava üssünü ele geçirdi’ http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160211_ypg_menag_hava_ussu

[3] Davutoğlu’ndan “PYD’yi vururuz” mesajı http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/davutoglundan-pydyi-vururuz-mesaji

[4] War, diplomacy and the Syrian tragedy http://sabahdai.ly/Ga6dy8

[5] Beyaz Saray’dan Biden-Davutoğlu açıklaması http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/beyaz-saraydan-biden-davutoglu-aciklamasi

[6] Dışişleri’nden Kirby’ye: Şiddetle protesto ediyoruz http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/disislerinden-kirbyye-siddetle-protesto-ediyoruz

[7] Müslim: Artık terörist olarak görmüyorlar http://bit.ly/1CMEG4O

[8] ‘Suudi jetleri Türkiye’de’ http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/suudi-jetleri-turkiyede

[9] ‘Suriye’ye kara gücü aciliyet kazandı’ http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/suriyeye-kara-gucu-aciliyet-kazandi

[10] Çavuşoğlu: S. Arabistan ile kara operasyona girebiliriz http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160213_suudi_jet

[11] It is important to note that main Kurdish political organizations is Syria (PYD) and Iraq (KDP) are in ideological conflict and do not  exhibit a unified stance towards the independence of Kurds in Syria and Iraq.

[12] Iraqi Kurdistan president: time has come to redraw Middle East boundaries http://gu.com/p/4g372/stw

[13] Independence of Iraqi Kurdistan would further complicate Sykes-Picot instability: Turkey’s AKP http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=94775&NewsCatID=338

[14] Davutoğlu, 10 maddelik eylem planını açıkladı http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1191137-basbakan-davutoglu-10-baslikta-master-plani-acikladi

[15] Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan ‘Esad’ açıklaması http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-esad-aciklamasi-30154366?utm_source=t.co&utm_campaign=button&utm_content=newsdetail

[16] Predicting Turkey’s next move in Syria http://aje.io/px5c

The Bomb That Changed The Way We Study International Relations

The A-bomb did not only decimate cities but also fundamentally changed the way we study International Relations. While the massive destruction of the bomb shocked masses, the scale of the destruction was also regarded as the pinnacle of the scientific method; the peak of mankind’s mastery over the nature, achieved by using science.

This awe-generating demonstration of the success of natural sciences (i.e. physics) triggered a search for applying its methodology to the study of the international. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, we witnessed the emergence of empricism, behavioralism, strategic studies and rational actor model, all of which strived to adopt the methods of the natural sciences. These methods can be summarized as “making observations, analyzing only the observable, making predictions with the aim of reaching generalizations.”

So far, I recited the dull story of how the A-bomb affected International Relations after WWII. However, the developments in the field of atomic physics have stayed relevant to the study of International Relations ever since. References to the study of atoms have been used for explaining ontological and epistemological debates in IR. Alexander Wendt, for example, compares social structures to “internal structures of atoms” while explaining a fundamental debate between empricists, who argue that only the observable count as valid objects to study, and scientific realists, who basically maintain that studying the unobservable also counts. In Wendt’s words: “… the fact that we can use theories about the (unobservable) internal structure of atoms to build nuclear weapons which can destroy cities is a good reason for the [scientific] realist to believe that such structures exist, as we understand them today” (Wendt 1987: 352).

Considering that recent theoretical debates in IR include a strand that applies aspects of quantum physics to the international, I evaluate this story of the interaction between natural and social science as a demonstration that the distinction between the two is indeed artificial. In fact, both interact frequently and both are shaped by the social and political context they operate in.

References:

Wendt, A. E. (1987). The agent-structure problem in international relations theory. International organization, 41(03), 335-370.

Philosophy of Science in the Practice of Turkish Politics

The policy relevance of meta-theory is frequently debated in both academia and policy circles. Most characterize meta-theoretical debates as exercises in philosophy that has little to do with the daily conduct of politics.

However, I came across two striking examples that demostrate how these debates indeed guide policy making and thus practice.

In 1931, during the Third Congress of the Republican People Party, Secretary General Recep Peker remarks that

“We consider as ours all those of our citizens who live among us, who belong politically and socially to the Turkish nation and among whom ideas and feelings such as ‘Kurdism, ‘Circassianism’ and even ‘Lazism’ and Pomakism’ have been implanted. We deem it our duty to banish, by sincere efforts, those false conceptions, which are the legacy of an absolutist regime and the product of long-standing historical oppression. The scientific truth of today does not allow an independent existence for a nation of several hundred thousand, or even of a million individuals…” (Peker quoted in Waxman 1997: 9)

This, I believe clearly demonstrates the deterministic, positivistic approach of the era, together with Kemal Atatürk’s saying that “Science is the true guide in life (Hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir)”

This positivist approach, with its claims of absolute truth, seems to have resulted in an oppressive practice that discredits other possibilities about social, political and religious identity; and legal venues for expressing them.

Fastforward to 1980s; after assuming office in the first multi-party elections following the 1980 coup, late prime minister and president Ozal rejected an absolute truth claim that Western civilization was pinnacle of human achievement and instead argued for a synthesis of equally valid Muslim and Western civilizations, which would be embodied in the nation of Turkey (Laciner 2003: 170-2). It is striking how this argument coincides with an era when positivist social science and its claims of objective truth was being challenged by a post-positivist school of thought that makes a case for the existence of multiple, constructed versions of reality.

But, it appears that in Turkish policy-making, rejection of one absolute truth claim does not necessarily entail peaceful coexistence of multiple versions of reality. For example, President Ozal in his argument for a synthesis between Islam and West, did not consider being human or being Anatolian as the common identity but being a Westernized Muslim.

These two examples, I believe, represent only a small fraction the link between meta-theory and practice. Such examples also point to the need for situating the political in a wider context that takes into account the trends in science and society and the relations between the two.

References:

Laçiner, S. (2003). Özalism (neo-Ottomanism): an alternative in Turkish foreign policy?. Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi, 1(1). pp. 170-2

Waxman, D. (1997). Islam and Turkish national identity: A reappraisal.Mediterranean Quarterly, 80. p.9

Chatting with google on citations and note taking

When I switched from Yahoo to Google as my default web search engine around 2003, I used to type in keywords on the search bar to get what I am looking for on the net. But since Google gained its own character and began correcting me on whether I meant something else, I recognize its snobby personality and directly ask questions to it as if something casually came to my mind and I was curious about its opinion.

Two days ago, I asked: “Is there a pdf program that I can highlight the document, take notes on it and export the notes?” These days I am trying to find a way to reduce my paper use as much as possible while doing research.

To my surprise it said yes! This is how I began using Mendeley. It is an almost perfect pdf organizer, reader and citation manager. It allows you to create a library along with subfolders, highlight and take notes on the pdf and then export only the notes in a single report.

In the good old days, I used to print out the article, underline the parts I find important, take notes on the margins, compile these notes and underlined parts in a Word document, repeat this for every article I read and then combine these Word reports to produce a research piece.

With Mendeley, I can now complete most of this process as I go. Once reading, highlighting and note taking is done, the program produces a report of the notes taken on the pdf. And thus with two clicks, I have a 3-page report of notes and quotations from a 30-page article. It is also very convenient for recalling the article later without going through the whole 30 pages.

The program also comes with a citation manager that has a cite-as-you-write feature. And the best part is it’s free.

Complexity Theory: Quantum Physics meets International Relations

Recently, I have been introduced to a new approach in International Relations: “Complexity Theory”. Inspired by the non-linear causation of the quantum physics, complexity theory seems to have some power in explaining change in international politics by emphasizing on “unintended consequences” and “unplanned interactions”. The theory makes a case for the unpredictability of human interactions, and assumes that “uncertainty is the norm and apprehension the mood” in global politics (Rosenau quoted in Kavalski 2007: 443). It  takes the international as complex systems and analyzes it through a variety of concepts such as “emergence”, “self-organization” and  “feedback”.

Just like quantum physics that strive to come up with a theory of everything, Complexity Theory forces us to think whether such theory could be possible in IR by highlighting interconnections in the “international life”. Also, its terminology, which includes phrases such as  “expecting unanticipated consequences” provokes some thought exercises.

According to its proponents, the theory is becoming more relevant as the number of actors and interactions between them has been proliferating for the last couple of decades. And the literature on complexity has been growing for the last ten years.

I think that using the complexity theory can help us discern the seemingly insignificant events that have led to path-breaking consequences as well as the networks that cause this exponential effect. Thus, it becomes possible to account for human agency without overemphasizing the determining power of structures or resorting to conspiracy theories.

The 2007 article below summarizes the theory for those who might be interested.

Kavalski, Emilian. “The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory: notes on the application of complexity theory to the study of international life.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20.3 (2007): 435-454.

Can international relations survive without theories?

As I returned to my academic studies after a 4-year break, I believe it is time to ask age-old questions and reach at conclusions that leave you hanging. Social sciences, anyone?

Recently, I began re-reading some graduate-level textbooks on IR theories, right from the beginning. As any good book, my IR textbooks begin with a chapter penned for convincing the reader that the book is talking about something worth listening to. And this translates into that International Relations discipline would shatter without IR theories. Well, IR (in capital letters, the academic discipline) would probably collapse instantly if we removed the theories but would international relations (the daily conduct of world politics) survive or even care about such a catastrophe?

For Steve Smith, IR theories fill the knowledge gaps. He starts out with the premise that even the decision makers in international relations sometimes don’t know the reasons behind the things they do. He says theories help us stuff these voids[1]. Therefore I understand that theories are for academic purposes only; they help the researcher make sense of an event, even when its culprits are not sure what they are doing.

However, I am quite sure that leaders do know what they are doing even if their course of action might be against our common sense. And on that knowledge gap, after spending some years as a part of state machinery, I have seen that decision-makers are daily supplied with a wide spectrum of expertise information, which usually cover most of the aspects of a given issue. For example, when Turkish president intends to visit a foreign country, he is provided with a quasi-encyclopedic booklet that covers bilateral political, economic, cultural, and societal relations as well as other issues Turkey wants to have a chat with that country. And occasionally these include classified information that are off limits for a researcher.

Likewise, while a researcher usually confines herself to a particular aspect of an issue, the decision maker is legally responsible for all related branches. So, is it still possible to talk about a knowledge gap to be filled with a theory on the side of the statespeople? This does not mean that they know everything. Every state keeps secrets and hiding information lies at the heart of diplomacy. But for what they don’t know, they make guesses or issue-based, operative theories such as “if we suggest cooperating on X, they will probably reject because they have other interests in the Y business with Z state.”

All of these up to now, makes me think that IR theories are just for academic purposes. They seem to be created to cover up for the information that the researcher cannot reach but the decision maker already posseses.

But before my professors who taught me IR theory lament the time they spent on me, I need to mention the some of the possible answers from IR literature.

Robert Cox for example, would maintain that the presidential booklet would be rife with implicit theories and value-laden statements about how life and international relations should be.[2]

Booth would argue that IR theories are indeed taken into account by statespeople for guiding their practice. And, he would warn, if these theories are inconsiderate of the wellbeing of individuals, they would open the path for disastrous consequences.[3]

Bilgin and Morton would say that the booklet was probably beefed up with knowledge that had already been produced under the guidance of an implicit or explicit theory.[4]

While writing this post and reading some more at the same time, I realized that the missing information which theory compensates for is not about the trade figures between two countries, number of citizens living in a foreign country nor a classified report about strength of rebel factions in a civil conflict. Rather, it is about the embedded philosophical assumptions[5] that led to compilation of a presidential info-booklet.

Going back to my initial question: can international relations survive without theories? Well probably not. That’s because even before the establishment of the discipline in 1919 and even before there were nations, the inter-city-state/inter-monarch/inter-faith relations were guided by set of ideas on how the world should be and who should get what. That presidential booklet would only reflect a fraction of these guiding ideas.

Yet, would it survive if we stopped studying these theories? That question begs for further research and thinking.

[1] Smith, Steve. “Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations.” International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Ed. Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013. 1-13.

[2] Cox, Robert W. “Social Forces States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millenium: Journal of International Studies 10.2 (1981): 126-55

[3] Booth, Ken. “Human wrongs and international relations.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) (1995): 103-126.

[4] Bilgin, Pinar, and Adam David Morton. “Historicising representations of’failed states’: beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?.” Third World Quarterly 23.1 (2002): 55-80.

[5] Hedley Bull (1973: 183-4) is quoted for this argument in Burchill, Scott, and Andrew Linklater. “Introduction.” Theories of International Relations. By Scott Burchill et al. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 1-30.

Some Vocabulary for Studying Mass Killings of Human Beings

World history is rife with massacres, slaughters, ethnic cleansings and genocides. Within the scope of a graduate course I am taking on diplomatic history, I have been reading on mass deportations and massacres for the past few week. My reading process unfortunately coincided with the Beirut and Paris attacks.

How one names an event of mass killing depends on the political stance of that particular person. But the way the event is named does not change the fact that scores of people had been slaughtered under a political agenda.

Every specific issue entails a specific set of vocabulary. Below are some words that are frequently used while describing the atrocious processes of mass killing of human beings:

contemptuous: manifesting, feeling, or expressing deep hatred or disapproval.

to obliterate: to remove utterly from recognition or memory; to remove from existence;   destroy utterly all trace, indication, or significance of.

to abet: to help, encourage, or support someone in a criminal act.

to emaciate:  to cause to lose flesh so as to become very thin.

dilapidated: decayed, deteriorated, or fallen into partial ruin especially through neglect or misuse;  in very bad condition because of age or lack of care.

travail: work especially of a painful or laborious nature: a physical or mental exertion or piece of work; agony, torment.

stench: a very bad smell

Note: All definitions are taken from Merriam-Webster online dictionary @ http://www.merriam-webster.com/