Turkish artillery shelled YPG positions in Azaz and Mannagh, Syria on February 13 and 14[1]. For most of the analysts, this move added another layer to the intricate civil war in Syria. Below are 4 things you need to know about Turkish shelling of YPG positions:
- The shelling was planned ahead with all warning signs:
Aiming to prevent the creation of a continuous Kurdish belt controlled by PYD, the Syria affiliate of PKK, on its southern border, Turkey has been threatening to hit PYD, and its armed branch YPG, for some time. With Afrin on the western end and Haseke on the eastern end, right now, the belt is interrupted by first a region close to Aleppo, where the regime forces are clashing with the opposition groups to retake the city and cut their supply line. Second, an ISIS controlled region east of this battleground further divides the Kurdish belt. Turkey was expecting a PYD attempt to unify this belt from the eastern part and Turkish threats for military intervention depended on the condition that the organization crossed to the “west of the Euphrates”. However, amid the turmoil of the clashes between the Russian-backed regime forces and the opposition in Aleppo, PYD opted for making advances from Afrin, the western end and captured the Mannagh airbase on February 10[2].
It appears that Turkish policy-makers conceived the possibility of hitting PYD after the capture of this base. On the following day, Prime Minister Davutoglu repeated the threat to hit YPG but this time without referring to the “west of Euphrates” condition. He said that Turkey would take the same precautions it has been taking against PKK (read: military action) if PYD causes any threat to Turkey[3].
Second, a prominent ideologue of AK Party and Spokesperson for the Presidency, Ibrahim Kalin published an opinion piece on the day of the shelling in Daily Sabah, a pro-government newspaper, in which he expressed disbelief in the Munich agreement for cessation of hostilities in Syria and emphasized on the need to establish “balance of power” on the ground[4]. As he takes the YPG capture of the Mannagh airbase as a “case in point”, it is possible analyse that the shelling was a politically planned move by Turkey.
- The shelling tested American position on YPG:
While US has repeatedly made it certain that it does not consider PYD and YPG terrorist organizations, it is compelled to strike an unsteady balance between Turkish demands and PYD/YPG. US warned both parties after the shelling, calling for Turkey to stop hitting YPG targets and criticizing YPG for making territorial gains amid the turmoil of the Russia-backed regime siege on Aleppo[5]. This double warning signifies that Turkey and YPG are equally significant allies in the eyes of the US policy makers, which -according to Turkish Foreign Ministry- implies that the US assumes similar status to a sovereign state and an armed militia [6].
- “Fight against ISIS” has become a cover story for everything but “the fight against ISIS”
Most of the actors use the phrase “fight against ISIS” as a cover story to further their interests, which often have little to do with taking down the terrorist organization.
PYD consider the fight against ISIS as a path to gain international legitimacy and possibly self-government in the near future[7].
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE use it to bolster their support to “moderate opposition” and overthrow the Assad regime. Just as regime forces mobilize to retake Aleppo from the rebels, Saudi Arabia, a staunch sponsor of the anti-Assad rebels, sent war jets to the Incirlik airbase in Turkey “to be used on the fight against ISIS[8]“. Yet, considering that the base is at 180 km distance from Aleppo battleground and Latakia, where Russian military base is placed, it is more likely that the jets aim to show muscle against the Russian-backed regime forces rather than ISIS. In the same vein, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey increased their calls to execute a multilateral ground operation in Syria to “counter ISIS[9]|[10]”. Yet the timing of these calls overlap with regime advances on the opposition.
Finally, Russia and the Assad regime are using the phrase -a broadened version of it as “fight against terrorism”- to give international legitimacy to their joint operations against the moderate opposition.
- Reshuffling of borders in Syria and Iraq is now an acknowledged possibility
While the artificiality of the borders in the Middle East has been a widely discussed in the academic literature and politics, the possibility of a change in these borders in Syria and Iraq is now being acknowledged on state-level. This year is of symbolic significance in this regard as it is the centennial of the Sykes-Picot agreement between England and France, which is credited for most of the current borders in the Middle East.
Within this context, Kurds in Syria and Iraq are undertaking initiatives to declare self-rule[11]. PYD declared the autonomous Western Kurdistan (Rojava) region within Syrian borders in 2013. Mesud Barzani, the head of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq has been expressing his will to “end the Sykes-Picot era” and declare independence[12]. Although opposing the idea of an independent Kurdistan on its southern and south-eastern border, AK Party spokesperson Omer Celik also acknowledged the artificiality of borders in the region[13]. Similarly, Prime Minister Davutoglu recently stressed on the problematic borders of the Sykes-Picot[14]. The positions of the actors differ but they unite in the discourse that the Sykes-Picot agreement created unstable borders, which are open to discussion.
The attempts to change the borders in the Middle East does not come from the Kurds only. According to President Erdogan, Assad is aiming to found -in Erdogan’s words- “a boutique Syria” encompassing 15% of the Syrian borders[15]. Thus, it appears that most of the prominent actors of the conflict in Syria and Iraq acknowledge the possibility that borders can change in the near future. Some analysts go even further and speculate that recent Turkish military assertiveness in Syria signifies an initiative to influence this expected change of borders in Syria and Iraq[16].
[1] Turkey strikes Kurdish militia in Syria, demands it withdraw http://reut.rs/1TYYvP4
[2] YPG Suriye’de ‘Menag hava üssünü ele geçirdi’ http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160211_ypg_menag_hava_ussu
[3] Davutoğlu’ndan “PYD’yi vururuz” mesajı http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/davutoglundan-pydyi-vururuz-mesaji
[4] War, diplomacy and the Syrian tragedy http://sabahdai.ly/Ga6dy8
[5] Beyaz Saray’dan Biden-Davutoğlu açıklaması http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/beyaz-saraydan-biden-davutoglu-aciklamasi
[6] Dışişleri’nden Kirby’ye: Şiddetle protesto ediyoruz http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/disislerinden-kirbyye-siddetle-protesto-ediyoruz
[7] Müslim: Artık terörist olarak görmüyorlar http://bit.ly/1CMEG4O
[8] ‘Suudi jetleri Türkiye’de’ http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/suudi-jetleri-turkiyede
[9] ‘Suriye’ye kara gücü aciliyet kazandı’ http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/suriyeye-kara-gucu-aciliyet-kazandi
[10] Çavuşoğlu: S. Arabistan ile kara operasyona girebiliriz http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160213_suudi_jet
[11] It is important to note that main Kurdish political organizations is Syria (PYD) and Iraq (KDP) are in ideological conflict and do not exhibit a unified stance towards the independence of Kurds in Syria and Iraq.
[12] Iraqi Kurdistan president: time has come to redraw Middle East boundaries http://gu.com/p/4g372/stw
[13] Independence of Iraqi Kurdistan would further complicate Sykes-Picot instability: Turkey’s AKP http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=94775&NewsCatID=338
[14] Davutoğlu, 10 maddelik eylem planını açıkladı http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1191137-basbakan-davutoglu-10-baslikta-master-plani-acikladi
[15] Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan ‘Esad’ açıklaması http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-esad-aciklamasi-30154366?utm_source=t.co&utm_campaign=button&utm_content=newsdetail
[16] Predicting Turkey’s next move in Syria http://aje.io/px5c
Emre Baran 